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CHARACTERIZATION OF EXPOSURE TO 
AGENT ORANGE IN VIETNAM VETERANS 
AS A BASIS FOR EPIDEMIOLOGICAL 
STUDIES 
Jeanne Mager Stellman, Ph.D. & Steven D. Stellman, Ph.D., 
M.P.H.∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 1961 and 1970, the U.S. military engaged in massive 
chemical defoliation and crop destruction operations in Southeast 
Asia.1 In 1985, nearly two decades after the spraying had ceased, a 
landmark tort settlement was reached between a class of Vietnam 
veterans and the chemical manufacturers that had supplied the 
Agent Orange and other military herbicides to the U.S. Department 
of Defense.2 It is notable that, at the time of the settlement, there 
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1 WILLIAM A. BUCKINGHAM, JR., OPERATION RANCH HAND: THE AIR 
FORCE AND HERBICIDES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1961-1971 (Office of U.S. Air 
Force History 1982). 
2 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985). 
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was little convincing epidemiological evidence available, either 
positive or negative, on the health consequences to veterans of the 
herbicide operations. Today, more than three decades after this 
massive environmental exposure, there is still a dearth of 
epidemiological data on the extent to which adverse health 
consequences resulted from the use, storage, and disposal of the 
herbicides in Vietnam. 
This paucity of epidemiological data stands in stark contrast to 
the extensive amount of experimental data available on dioxin, an 
important contaminant in about 60% of the herbicide sprayed.3 
Much laboratory data convincingly demonstrate dioxin’s extreme 
toxicity.4 The scientific literature also is growing with respect to 
the carcinogenicity of the organic arsenical that was a primary 
component of the Agent Blue used to destroy enemy food crops.5 
Many epidemiological studies have been carried out on other, 
much smaller populations exposed to the same chemicals. Indeed, 
when the Institute of Medicine (IOM) conducts its biennial review 
of the scientific literature and provides the Department of Veterans 
                                                          
3 The chemical composition of three major herbicides used in Vietnam and 
the quantity dispersed are as follows: 
Agent                        Composition                                    Gallons 
Agent Orange 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T* 12,066,840 
Agent White Picloram, 2,4-D 5,430,462 
 
Agent Blue Dimethylarsinic acid  
(Synonym: Cacodylic acid) 
1,252,541 
*Contaminated with 2,3,7,8-TCDD (dioxin) 
More detailed data are given in Jeanne Mager Stellman et al., The Extent and 
Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam, 422 
NATURE 681 (2003) [hereinafter Stellman et al., The Extent and Patterns of 
Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam]. 
4 See, e.g., OFFICE OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NO. EPA/600/8-84/014F, HEALTH ASSESSMENT 
DOCUMENT FOR POLYCHLORINATED DIBENZO-P-DIOXINS, FINAL REPORT (1985). 
5 Hideki Wanibuchi et al., Carcinogenicity of an Organic Arsenical, 
Dimethylarsinic Acid and Related Arsenicals in Rat Urinary Bladder, 40 PROC. 
OF THE AM. ASS’N FOR CANCER RES. 349 (1999); Min Wei et al., Urinary 
Bladder Carcinogenicity of Dimethylarsinic Acid in Male F344 Rats, 20 
CARCINOGENESIS 1873 (1999). 
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Affairs (VA) with a summary, including its appraisal of the 
relationship between herbicide exposures and a list of health 
outcomes, it relies to a large extent on studies carried out on non-
veteran populations to support its conclusions.6 The degree to 
which these other studies correctly estimate health effects in 
Vietnam veterans is not known. Thus there continue to be practical 
ramifications to the paucity of definitive epidemiological studies 
on a sufficiently large exposed population of either veterans or 
Vietnamese citizens.7 
                                                          
6 In accordance with the Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 
Stat. 11 (1991) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1116), the Committee to 
Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides was 
asked “to determine (to the extent that available data permit meaningful 
determinations)” the following regarding associations between specific health 
outcomes and exposure to TCDD and other chemical compounds in herbicides: 
A) whether a statistical association with herbicide exposure exists, 
taking into account the strength of the scientific evidence and the 
appropriateness of the statistical and epidemiological methods used to 
detect the association; B) the increased risk of the disease among those 
exposed to herbicides during service in the Republic of Vietnam during 
the Vietnam era; and C) whether there exists a plausible biological 
mechanism or other evidence of a causal relationship between herbicide 
exposure and the disease. 
38 U.S.C. § 1116. See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN 
VIETNAM VETERANS OF EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE: HEALTH EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES USED IN 
VIETNAM (1994) [hereinafter 1994 IOM REPORT], available at http://books.nap. 
edu/books/0309048877/html/index.html. The Institute of Medicine publishes 
biennial updates based upon the deliberations of its Committee to Review the 
Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of Exposure to Herbicides. The series is 
VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE of which there are 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 
2004 publications. 
7 Epidemiological studies can be used to support arguments that a disease 
or dysfunction is more likely than not to have arisen from a particular causative 
agent. Epidemiological studies examine the statistical distribution of a disease 
(or other outcome) in two populations: one that was “exposed” to the agent or 
condition under study and another “control” population not exposed and as alike 
as possible in every other way to the exposed group. If the rate of disease 
observed in the exposed population is greater than in the control population, and 
if the rate differences satisfy certain statistical requirements, the rate difference 
will be called “significant.” 
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This article discusses some of the factors that have contributed 
to the lack of epidemiological evidence on military herbicide 
operations. Part I of this article will provide a brief overview of the 
purposes and methodology of environmental epidemiological 
studies. Part II will discuss the application of this methodology to 
exposed Vietnam veterans. In particular, this section will examine 
the use of exposure opportunity measures in epidemiological 
studies as well as recent successful work on the development and 
use of military records for estimating exposure opportunity to 
military herbicides in Vietnam. This article concludes that while 
there are sufficiently large populations available for study and 
appropriate methodologies to carry out such studies, these much-
needed epidemiological investigations remain unfunded and 
undone, so that both legal and public policy decisions must 
continue to be made with inadequate scientific data. 
I. ENVIRONMENTAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 
A valid environmental epidemiology study relating an 
exposure to subsequent risk of disease requires a biologically 
reasonable hypothesis, an exposed population, and either an 
unexposed population or a set of disease rates in a reference 
population to which the rate of disease in the study group can be 
compared. Usually there are experimental laboratory studies or 
clinical reports of adverse health effects in individuals that can be 
used to generate a “null” hypothesis of the form: “Exposure to 
agent XYZ is not related to development of disease ABC.” The 
purpose of the epidemiological study is to test the null hypothesis. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected (i.e., a statistically significant 
difference in rates is observed between the exposed and 
unexposed), then the study is considered positive and a relationship 
between the exposure and the outcome is supported.8 
                                                          
8 Note the use of the word “supported.” Epidemiological studies do not 
establish cause and effect. Rather, they indicate that there is a statistical 
likelihood that a relationship between the exposure and the outcome exists. 
Generally, epidemiologists require a 95% certainty that the relationship is not 
compatible with chance in order to consider an outcome significant. Failure to 
meet this criterion is a type 1 error. 
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A successful study of this nature requires a suitably large 
population with sufficiently great exposure to agent XYZ to elicit 
the measured health effect.9 Additionally, the population’s 
exposure to the agent and the subsequent study must be adequately 
spaced over time to have permitted XYZ an opportunity to induce 
disease ABC. In fulfilling these requirements, epidemiological 
studies must endeavor to identify all members of the at-risk 
population, to successfully find and enroll these individuals in the 
study, and to take into account other exposures (e.g., cigarette 
smoking or occupational exposures) that also could lead to the 
disease under study. It is also critically important that the exposed 
population truly consist of exposed individuals. Many 
environmental epidemiology studies have been compromised by 
the inclusion of non-exposed individuals, for example, non-
exposed clerical or management staff in a study of chemical plant 
workers. Such dilution of a truly exposed population with 
unexposed individuals is known as “differential misclassification” 
of exposure and can result in an underestimate of the true 
association between exposure and disease.10 There are many 
instances of such misclassification errors in existing studies of 
Vietnam veterans.11 
In all cases, a necessity for the successful design and execution 
of an environmental epidemiology study is the ability to define 
“exposure.” Poorly defined population exposures can lead to two 
                                                          
9 The population size, the anticipated effect size (i.e. the environmental 
agent’s potency as measured by the difference between the disease risk in the 
exposed group and that in an unexposed reference group), and the desired level 
of statistical certainty all contribute to the statistical “power” to actually observe 
an effect if it is present. If there are too few exposed people or the effect size is 
very small, an epidemiologic study may be useless and failure to reject the null 
hypothesis (a negative result) non-informative. This is known as a type 2 error. 
10 KENNETH J. ROTHMAN & SANDER GREENLAND, MODERN 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 126-27 (1998). 
11 JEANNE MAGER STELLMAN & STEVEN D. STELLMAN, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, SUBCONTRACT VA-5124-98-0019, CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE OF 
VETERANS TO AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM: FINAL 
REPORT 109 tbl.32 (2003) [hereinafter STELLMAN & STELLMAN, 
CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE OF VETERANS TO AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER 
HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM]. 
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sources of misclassification error: unexposed people are 
considered exposed or exposed people are considered not exposed. 
Both types of error may occur in a given study and may lead to 
unpredictable errors in estimates of exposure-disease associations. 
For example, in the Air Force Health Study of Vietnam veterans 
who were assigned to the herbicide spray operations, many in the 
reference comparison group in fact had elevated blood levels of 
dioxin, while many in the study population had non-detectable 
levels. 
Assigning exposure levels in epidemiology studies of chronic 
exposures almost always poses great methodological challenges.12 
Unlike “acute” exposures to an agent suspected of causing a health 
effect (e.g., reactions to an implanted medical device or exposure 
to environmental agents arising from industrial accidents or non-
industrial events, such as carbon monoxide poisoning from faulty 
heaters), most chronic environmental exposures are characterized 
by poor, incomplete, or even nonexistent measurements of actual 
exposure levels. The “exposed” population may also have been 
exposed to a host of other agents that could potentially cause the 
same outcome and will have spent discontinuous—and usually 
undocumented—periods of time being “exposed.” Studies are 
often carried out years after the exposure has ended, making it 
difficult, if not impossible, to find extant biological evidence of the 
                                                          
12 A valid metric for assigning exposures is a necessary element of an 
epidemiology study—without it one cannot differentiate the exposed from the 
controls. In addition, epidemiologists place higher confidence in studies that 
demonstrate that the higher the dose of the exposure, the more likely the 
outcome. For example, a cigarette smoker with a lifetime history of smoking one 
pack per day, on average, has a relative risk of lung cancer eight to ten times that 
of never-smokers, while a two pack per day smoker has a risk twenty times that 
of a nonsmoker. Steven D. Stellman et al., Lung Cancer Risk in White and Black 
Americans, 13 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 294, 298 (2003). Thus, it is desirable 
to have a metric that permits the exposure to be more than simply ever/never, 
but rather quantified so that a dose-response relationship can be tested and the 
risk at high doses compared with that at low doses. For a discussion of the 
importance of dose-response relationships in epidemiological studies, see Leslie 
Stayner et al., Sources of Uncertainty in Dose-Response Modeling of 
Epidemiological Data for Cancer Risk Assessment, 895 ANNALS OF THE NEW 
YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 212 (1999). 
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exposure among individuals thought to have been exposed and, for 
many environmental exposures, no adequate biomarkers exist.13 
Ubiquitous environmental agents complicate the job of finding a 
truly unexposed control population. 
II. EPIDEMIOLOGY AND VIETNAM VETERANS 
Whether the military use of herbicides in Vietnam lends itself 
to the basic requirements for an environmental epidemiology study 
merits examination. Such a study could test the following 
generalized null hypothesis, “Exposure to military herbicides used 
during the Vietnam War did not lead to adverse health outcomes 
among the exposed populations or their offspring,” or a related, 
more general hypothesis that “military service in areas sprayed by 
military herbicides did not lead to adverse health outcomes.” 
It is clear from the IOM’s summaries of available experimental 
evidence that there exist sufficient toxicological and clinical data 
to justify undertaking major epidemiology studies for a variety of 
disease outcomes. In particular, the large quantity of herbicide that 
the United States sprayed in Vietnam as well as the vast amounts 
                                                          
13 For many environmental agents, even if one had a scientifically valid 
exposure metric, the extent of exposure might not yield a population that is large 
enough for a successful epidemiological study to be carried out because the 
number of exposed persons is small, the intensity of the exposures is low, or, 
with the passage of time, the amount of chemical in exposed individuals’ bodies 
declines due to metabolic processes. In any of these cases, the ability to detect 
an association between exposure and disease is very limited, as expressed 
numerically by the concept of statistical power. Statistical power is defined as 
the probability that a statistical test will yield a significant result. JACOB COHEN, 
STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1 (Academic 
Press 1977). Thus, a weak environmental agent that does indeed cause a disease 
(small effect size) would require a very large population N for the observed 
difference in rates to reach significance. If a legal criterion demands an effect 
size of a twofold difference between the exposed and non-exposed, the size of 
the populations studied would also have to be expanded in relation to a criterion 
which demanded a 50% increase (i.e. twofold relative risk). The necessary 
population size for the study will also depend on the rate at which the disease is 
observed in the unexposed population. Agents that cause rare diseases may be 
less likely to be identified than those that cause common diseases because too 
few cases ever occur to satisfy the requirements of statistical power. 
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that it manufactured would provide epidemiological studies with a 
sufficiently large sample of affected individuals and chemical 
resources. Nearly 20 million gallons of military herbicides were 
sprayed in Vietnam and Laos between 1961 and 1971. Agent 
Orange accounted for more than 12 million gallons of these 
herbicides. The chemical consists of a 50:50 mixture of two 
phenoxyherbicides, 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, with much of the 2,4,5-T 
component contaminated with dioxins and dibenzofurans. The 
most notorious and deadly of these contaminants is 2,3,7,8-
tetrachloro-p-dibenodioxin, usually simply called dioxin, although 
the precise levels of contamination are not known.14 These 
chemicals are unwanted byproducts of the manufacturing process 
and are inevitably present unless manufacturing conditions are 
carefully controlled.15 Even prior to the 1985 Agent Orange tort 
settlement, there was no question regarding dioxin’s deadly 
effects.16 
In order to proceed with an epidemiological study of Agent 
Orange, there must be a suitable population available for study. 
The authors have calculated that between 3 and 5 million 
Vietnamese citizens were directly in the spray path of the 
herbicide.17 Many areas, so-called “hotspots,” are still highly 
contaminated with TCDD residues and a variety of bioassays have 
found that Vietnamese individuals have higher-than-normal levels 
of dioxin in their tissue,18 although there is little data on the 
                                                          
14 Stellman et al., The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and 
Other Herbicides in Vietnam, supra note 3, at 682. 
15 ALASTAIR HAY, THE CHEMICAL SCYTHE: LESSONS OF 2,4,5-T AND 
DIOXIN (Plenum Press 1982). 
16 Indeed, in its decision with respect to the Agent Orange Class action, the 
court stated: 
As to the poisonous nature of dioxin and its ability to cause harm to 
mammals, including homo sapiens, there is no doubt. The form of 
dioxin implicated in Agent Orange is a dangerous, stable, long lasting 
chemical. . . . Dioxin is one of the most powerful poisons known . . . . 
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 777 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
17 Stellman et al., The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and 
Other Herbicides in Vietnam, supra note 3, at 684. 
18 Arnold Schecter, Food As a Source of Dioxin Exposure in the Residents 
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relationship between body burden and putative exposure. While 
the precise number is not known, it is estimated that about 3 
million American soldiers served in the Vietnam theatre.19 Soldiers 
directly charged with carrying out the Air Force Operation Ranch 
Hand, the name for the military operation that carried out the great 
majority of aerial defoliation and crop destruction missions, were 
potentially exposed to herbicides.20 Similarly, some, but certainly 
not all, of those belonging to the Army Chemical Corps, another 
group that has been studied, were also potentially were exposed. It 
would be erroneous to classify all of these individuals as 
potentially exposed.21 Some Army troops were herbicide handlers 
or backpack sprayers, or were engaged in missions to keep base 
camp perimeters free from vision-blocking foliage. There is 
evidence that those whose missions brought them into recently 
defoliated areas absorbed the herbicides.22 Finally, military unit 
                                                          
of Bien Hoa City, Vietnam, 45 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED., 781, 781-
82 (2003). 
19 Sharon R. Cohany, The Vietnam-Era Cohort: Employment and Earnings, 
115 MONTHLY LABOR REV. 3, 5 (1992). 
20 The Air Force Health Study often called the Ranch Hand study, a 20-
year longitudinal study examining health, mortality, and reproductive outcomes, 
has found associations between Ranch Hand service and subsequent risk of 
prostate cancer and Type II diabetes. Matthew P. Longnecker & Joel E. 
Michalek, Serum Dioxin Level in Relation to Diabetes Mellitus among Air Force 
Veterans with Background Levels of Exposure, 11 EPIDEMIOLOGY 44 (2000). 
This study, however, because of its unavoidably small size, is not informative on 
rarer cancers. 
21 Serum dioxin levels in the Air Force Health Study for the comparison 
group reach a level nearly twice that of the Ranch Hand low category group in 
the study population. See Akhtar et al., Cancer in US Air Force Veterans of the 
Vietnam War, 46 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 123, 127 (2004). Some 
Air Force personnel not directly assigned to the herbicide operational units did, 
in fact, have work assignments that brought them into contact with herbicides, 
while some flight personnel, notably pilots, who never handled herbicides, had 
access to shower and laundry facilities and flew in air pressurized cabins. See 
BUCKINGHAM, supra note 1 (providing an extensive history of the military 
herbicide program in Vietnam). The exposure misclassification of the 
comparison group as unexposed would, however, tend to strengthen our 
confidence in the positive cancer findings. See supra note 20. 
22 Peter C. Kahn et al., Dioxins and Dibenzofurans in Blood and Adipose 
Tissue of Agent Orange-Exposed Vietnam Veterans and Matched Controls, 259 
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history records show that a sufficiently large number of units were 
directly sprayed during Operation Ranch Hand to justify large-
scale studies.23 
The extent to which soldiers entering into previously sprayed 
areas or living in base camps in which the perimeters were 
regularly cleared with defoliants received a biologically significant 
dose of herbicides or their contaminants is not clear. Because so 
many years have passed since the exposure, measurement of the 
current body burden of dioxin is subject to serious 
misclassification errors, and biomarkers are not available for 
herbicide formulations that were not contaminated with TCDD.24 
                                                          
JAMA 1661 (1988) (showing that the leaders of jungle patrols in heavily 
sprayed areas, so-called “pointmen,” had elevated levels of dioxin compared to a 
matched unexposed control population). 
23 See STELLMAN & STELLMAN, CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE OF VETERANS 
TO AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, supra note 11, at 48 
tbl.11. Table 11 demonstrates numerous documented instances in which combat 
units were subject to “direct hits” from herbicide spray. The direct spraying of 
combat units has been a contentious issue for several decades. The history of the 
controversy is well described in the IOM’s 1994 report. Both the White House 
Agent Orange Working Group and the Centers for Disease Control, Centers for 
Disease Control Veterans Health Studies, Serum 2,3,7,8-Tetrachloro-P-
Dibenzo-P-Dioxin Levels in U.S. Army Vietnam-Era Veterans, 260 JAMA 1249 
(1988) [hereinafter CDC Veterans Health Studies], have declared that ground 
troops were not exposed to herbicides and that only those troops with duties that 
involved the handling and spraying operations were exposed. Examination of 
military archives by the U.S. General Accounting Office, COMPTROLLER 
GENERAL OF THE U.S., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. GROUND 
TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WERE IN AREAS SPRAYED WITH HERBICIDE 
ORANGE (1979), available at http://161.203.16.4/f0302/110930.pdf, and by the 
CDC itself found a significant number of troops to have been located directly 
under the spray path. Centers for Disease Control, AGENT ORANGE STUDY: 
EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT: PROCEDURES AND STATISTICAL ISSUES (CDC Agent 
Orange Project, Agent Orange Projects Interim Report, Draft, Feb. 1985). 
24 The Institute of Medicine has specifically addressed the difficulties in 
using current body burden measurements of dioxin to reflect past exposures in 
Vietnam. First, during its oversight of the original CDC Agent Orange Study, 
the IOM rejected the CDC proposal to “validate” military records of troop 
location by using serum dioxin samples obtained at least two decades post-
exposure. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CDC STUDY OF THE HEALTH OF 
VIETNAM VETERANS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FIFTH LETTER REPORT, REVIEW 
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For these soldiers, service in an area with a history of herbicide 
spraying would be the relevant measure of exposure (called an 
“exposure opportunity index,” or EOI) rather than a measure of 
biological dose. Such studies would seek to test the hypothesis that 
military service in defoliated areas increased the risk that soldiers 
would develop the diseases under study and that the risk was 
proportional to the soldiers’ proximity in time and space to the 
spraying.25 
A. Agent Orange and Measures of Exposure 
Methodological difficulties in assigning relative Agent Orange 
                                                          
OF COMPARISON OF SERUM LEVELS OF 2,3,7,8-TCDD WITH INDIRECT 
ESTIMATES OF AGENT ORANGE EXPOSURE IN VIETNAM VETERANS (1987). The 
CDC continued its “validation study” notwithstanding, CDC VETERANS HEALTH 
STUDIES, supra, and, as a result of a purported lack of correlation between serum 
dioxin and a records-based exposure index, abandoned the large Agent Orange 
Study of III Corps Army combat battalions already underway. Agreeing with the 
aforementioned IOM critique, a second IOM committee reviewed the conceptual 
underpinnings of the CDC validation study, and, in contradistinction to the CDC 
and Agent Orange Working Group conclusion, recommended that a study be 
conducted on the utility of the historical reconstruction of military records for 
characterizing exposure to military herbicides in Vietnam. See 1994 IOM 
REPORT, supra note 6. 
25 It should be noted that broad studies on the health of Vietnam veterans 
are not informative with respect to the health effects of Agent Orange because of 
serious misclassification errors that arise from considering the fact of service in 
Vietnam to be equivalent to having served in a sprayed area. The large-scale 
study undertaken by the Centers for Disease Control on the health of troops 
assigned to Vietnam, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH STATUS OF VIETNAM VETERANS: VIETNAM 
EXPERIENCE STUDY (1989) (Vols. I-V, Supplements A-C), for example, reveals 
nothing about Agent Orange and other herbicides, nor was it the intent of the 
study to address this issue. The same is true for the Selected Cancer Study. See 
SELECTED CANCERS COOPERATIVE STUDY GROUP, ASS’N OF SELECTED 
CANCERS WITH SERVICE IN THE U.S. MILITARY IN VIETNAM, II. SOFT-TISSUE 
AND OTHER SARCOMAS, 150 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2485 (1990); 
SELECTED CANCERS COOPERATIVE STUDY GROUP, ASS’N OF SELECTED 
CANCERS WITH SERVICE IN THE U.S. MILITARY IN VIETNAM, III. HODGKIN’S 
DISEASE, NASAL CANCER, NASOPHARYNGEAL CANCER, AND PRIMARY LIVER 
CANCER, 150 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2495 (1990). 
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exposure levels to Vietnam veterans have been a major roadblock 
to carrying out large-scale epidemiology studies of the relationship 
between exposure to military herbicides and adverse health 
outcomes. Indeed, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and the Agent Orange Working Group, a subcommittee of 
the White House Domestic Policy Council, declared that military 
records could not be used to reconstruct past exposures, and the 
CDC Agent Orange Study was abruptly halted, with unused funds 
being returned to the Treasury.26 
In 1994, however, the IOM again did not concur with the 
federal scientists’ conclusions that any epidemiological study was 
ipso facto impossible because of the inability to classify exposure 
based on military records. The IOM recommended that a 
methodological study be undertaken to determine whether methods 
involving the historical reconstruction of military records could be 
used for characterizing exposure to herbicides in Vietnam and as 
the basis for epidemiology studies of Vietnam veteran health. The 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) subsequently received a 
contract from the VA to seek independent researchers to develop 
an appropriate methodology to conduct the investigation. The 
exposure opportunity methodology described in this article is the 
result of a subcontract from the NAS undertaken by the authors for 
that purpose.27 In 1998, a project was begun to refine and validate 
an EOI methodology that had previously been used in the exposure 
assessment of claimants to the Agent Orange Veterans Payment 
Program28 and in studies of Vietnamese citizens29 and American 
                                                          
26 The abandonment of the Agent Orange Study was the subject of 
unsuccessful litigation by the American Legion and the Vietnam Veterans of 
America, who sought to have the congressionally mandated study reinstated. See 
American Legion v. Derwinski, 54 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1995); American Legion 
v. Derwinski, 827 F. Supp. 805 (D.D.C. 1993). 
27 See 1994 IOM REPORT, supra note 6; COMMITTEE ON THE ASSESSMENT 
OF WARTIME EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, 
CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE OF VETERANS TO AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER 
HERBICIDES USED IN VIETNAM: SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING A 
REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS FOR RESEARCH (1997). 
28 The original methodology was the basis for assessing exposure eligibility 
for the Agent Orange Veterans Payment Program, established in the Agent 
Orange class action settlement. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. 
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Vietnam veterans.30 
EOI models, which are becoming increasingly common in 
epidemiological studies, typically represent exposure as a function 
of proximity in time and space to a toxic agent.31 An EOI is often 
used, for example, in occupational or environmental studies as a 
surrogate estimator of historical exposure where current 
environmental or biomarker measurements are inadequate 
estimators of past exposures and where measurements were never 
made in the past or are unavailable.32 The EOI concept is 
complementary to traditional exposure methodologies based upon 
toxicological models and measures. Exposure opportunity is not in 
itself a toxicological measure, but EOI scores can be incorporated 
into toxicological models as “presentation” dosages. Such dosages 
are intended for use in large-scale studies in which a location 
history is the principal source of information about an individual or 
group, such as a military unit. These models are especially 
applicable to studies in which body burden measurements are 
impractical or unlikely to reflect exposures in the distant past. 
To perfect an EOI model for military herbicides in Vietnam, a 
Geographical Information System (GIS) for the former Republic of 
Vietnam was created. The GIS is a relational database whose 
                                                          
Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
29 Marie-Catherine Ha et al., Agent Orange and the Risk of Gestational 
Trophoblastic Disease in Vietnam, 51 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 368 (1996). 
30 A cross-sectional study of American Legionnaires utilized an earlier 
version of the EOI methods described here. See Steven D. Stellman & Jeanne 
Mager Stellman, Estimation of Exposure to Agent Orange and Other Defoliants 
Among American Troops in Vietnam: A Methodological Approach, 9 AM. J. 
INDUS. MED. 305 (1986), for the methodology and Steven D. Stellman et al., 
Combat and Herbicide Exposure in Vietnam Among American Legionnaires, 47 
ENVTL. RESEARCH 112, 120-21 (1988), for the distribution of EOIs in the 
cohort. 
31 See, e.g., Kirk R. Smith, Place Makes the Poison: Wesolowski Award 
Lecture – 1999, 12 J. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS. & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 167 
(2002); Mary H. Ward et al., Identifying Populations Potentially Exposed to 
Agricultural Pesticides Using Remote Sensing and a Geographic Information 
System, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 5 (2000). 
32 See, e.g., E. S. Schaeffner et al., Use of an Asbestos Exposure Score and 
the Presence of Pleural and Parenchymal Abnormalities in a Lung Cancer Case 
Series, 7 INT’L J. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 14 (2001). 
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component tables (the “layers”) contain data on herbicide 
application, military troop location, and other geographically 
encoded data resources that are designed to be utilized in the 
assessment of exposure to herbicides and exposure-related health 
risks for specific populations. Table 1 contains an abbreviated list 
of data layers that are currently included in the GIS.33 The GIS is 
built around two interrelated concepts: the partitioning of Vietnam 
into 0.01° x 0.01° “square” grids and the association of the 
geographic center of each grid with a continuous EOI and a vector 
of four proximity “hit” scores.34 Data in each layer have been 
geocoded in a manner compatible with our Vietnam grid system. 
Unique grid identifiers serve to link data between cartographic 
layers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Adapted from Jeanne Mager Stellman et al., A Geographic Information 
System for Characterizing Exposure to Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in 
Vietnam, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 321, 322 (2003). 
34 The EOI takes into account entry into areas sprayed in the past as well as 
being present during an actual spray mission. A conservative first-order decay 
model is used to simulate the decay of herbicide in the environment. The term 
“hit” is applied when an individual actually was located in or near the spray path 
during a mission. The mathematical representations of these two models are 
given in Steven D. Stellman & Jeanne Mager Stellman, Exposure Opportunity 
Models for Agent Orange, Dioxin, and Other Military Herbicides Used in 
Vietnam, 1961-1971, 14 J. EXPOSURE, ANALYSIS & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 354 
(2004). 
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Table 1. GIS data tables (“layers”) of location and herbicide 
spray data that can be linked to create exposure opportunity 
scores.35 
Type of activity or 
data 
Examples 
HERBS file Flight paths and other details of herbicide 
spray applications 
Civilian habitations Cities, towns, villages, hamlets, plantations 
Vietnam land and 
water features 
Soil typology, land topography, rivers, 
streams  
Civil structures Roadways, utility lines, rail lines, canals, 
air fields 
Military structures Military bases, base camps, landing zones, 
air fields 
Troop locations Headquarters, base camps, depots, and 
other locations assigned to support and 
combat support units; tracked locations for 
combat troops  
Operation Ranch 
Hand Targets 
Specific areas designated for defoliation 
and crop destruction by an elaborate 
approval mechanism 
Herbicide storage, 
transport, and 
unplanned dispersal 
Locations of known “incidents” such as 
spills, dumps, and crashes 
 
At the heart of exposure assessment is a comprehensive 
database, known as the HERBS file, that describes all documented 
herbicide applications that were carried out by the U.S. military 
during the Vietnam War. This database was compiled from a wide 
variety of archival sources under a contract from the NAS. The 
HERBS file contains information consisting of one or more 
records that collectively describe the spray coordinates of single or 
multiple aircraft (known as sorties) during 9,141 missions. The 
majority of spray (about 18 million gallons) was applied by 
specially equipped C-123 transport aircraft in Operation Ranch 
Hand. The chief herbicide uses were defoliation and crop 
                                                          
35 See Stellman et al., supra note 33, for more details. 
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destruction. During the work undertaken for the NAS, the HERBS 
file was extensively corrected and validated.36 U.S. Army (not Air 
Force) personnel sprayed tens of thousands of gallons along base 
camp perimeters, waterways, and communication lines by 
helicopter, backpack, truck, and boat. Each of these modalities was 
calibrated to spray the phenoxyherbicides at a rate of 3 gallons per 
acre. A large percentage of these missions were entered into a 
second HERBS file, sometimes called the Services-HERBS. A 
major data cleaning and reconciliation effort was undertaken to 
eliminate redundancies in these two files, and the current version 
of the HERBS file contained in the GIS reflects those quality 
control changes. 
More than 98% of all herbicide spraying was by fixed-wing 
aircraft. Key to the usefulness of the HERBS file is the fact that it 
describes the actual flight paths taken by the Ranch Hand aircraft. 
For example, the HERBS file contains “leg designators” that 
permit the reconstruction of the contiguous flight paths of 5,215 
fixed-wing Ranch Hand missions, most with multiple sorties. 
Although the GIS is a useful tool for visualizing locations of 
individuals or military units in relation to herbicide applications, 
the sheer quantity of data in both the herbicide and unit location 
databases and the almost limitless possibilities for temporal and 
spatial variation make calculation of exposure opportunity scores a 
formidable challenge. To reduce this task to manageable 
proportions, a user-friendly software system called Herbicide 
Exposure Assessment – Vietnam (HEA-V) was created.37 The 
software accepts as input a “location history” database in 
Microsoft Excel or Access format and produces as output a set of 
“hits” scores and the EOI score for each input record. The input 
may pertain equally to a specific military unit that traveled from 
one place to another or to an individual who belonged to that unit. 
It may also pertain to a fixed location, such as a village, hamlet, or 
                                                          
36 Details of the process whereby the HERBS file was corrected are given 
in STELLMAN & STELLMAN, CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE OF VETERANS TO 
AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, supra note 11, at 5-7. 
37 Stellman & Greene Consulting, Herbicide Exposure Assessment-
Vietnam (HEA-V), software manual and appendices (Brooklyn, N.Y., Found. 
for Worker, Veteran and Envtl. Health, Inc. 2003) (on file with author). 
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other geographical entity. It is thus equally suited for use in both 
epidemiological and ecological studies. 
B. Military Unit Location Database Core Data Layer 
In the course of providing exposure analyses for the Agent 
Orange Veterans Payment Program (AOVPP), a database was 
compiled (at the battalion level) reflecting those locations at which 
AOVPP claimants were stationed. Further troop location data for 
all Army combat support units assigned to Vietnam have now been 
compiled from a variety of primary and secondary military 
sources.38 Through a Freedom of Information Act request, the 
Special Master to the AOVPP obtained data files that contained the 
locations of many Army combat military units. The files had been 
created in the course of the CDC’s aforementioned abandoned 
Agent Orange Study. The data were compiled by the Department 
of Defense Environmental Support Group, which had identified 
and tracked more than sixty combat battalions stationed in the III 
Corps Tactical Zone, a very heavily sprayed region extending from 
the southern coast of Vietnam to the Cambodian border and 
including Saigon. The Support Group tracked the daily activities 
and locations of individual companies in these battalions between 
1967 and 1969 utilizing a wide variety of data sources, such as 
daily journals and ORLLs (Operations Reports and Lessons 
Learned). These data have now been updated and extensively 
“cleaned” to remove obvious typographical errors; the GIS now 
                                                          
38 In general, approximately five out of six troops serve in such support 
units, which we call “stable” units because troops are stationed at specific base 
camps and are not required to move frequently. The ratio in Vietnam appears to 
have been lower, with proportionately more troops assigned to combat. There 
were more than 1,650 “stable” Army units, which together had an average 
authorized troop strength of just under 200,000. Nearly 1,000 additional units, 
whose authorized total troop strength was about 162,000, were also largely 
stationary but had “mobile elements” who routinely left base camps to carry out 
their missions. These units included Aviation, Engineering, Ordnance, Signal, 
Transportation, and Medical Corps and Military Police. The stable units 
provided support for more than 400 highly mobile units, such as Infantry, 
Armor, Cavalry, and Artillery battalions, whose strength averaged more than 
120,606. 
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contains detailed location data for sixty-three combat battalions for 
the time period between 1967 and 1969.39 In addition, non-
exhaustive databases for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines 
also have been compiled.40 
With knowledge of the unit to which an individual was 
assigned and the individual’s dates of assignment, it is thus 
possible to link the individual to various locations over time. These 
locations and dates then become input data for the exposure 
opportunity calculations. Thus, for any given location, military 
unit, or individual, researchers can calculate an EOI as a 
quantitative spatio-temporal representation of that individual’s 
proximity to a toxic agent. The EOI model takes into account three 
independent factors that determine an individual’s exposure: 
concentration of the toxicologically active substance, distance from 
the spray application, and the time during which the exposure may 
have taken place. Details of this exposure methodology have been 
published.41 
Extensive calculations have been carried out to validate EOI 
measurements. Those locations at which military units were found 
to have high EOI scores coincide closely with the “hot spots” 
indicated in EOI surface plots of Vietnam. The log-normal 
distributions of exposure scores, especially those that show 
                                                          
39 The CDC had asserted that these extracted files contained location gaps 
that invalidate them as a data source for epidemiological studies. The data 
cleaning carried out during the course of our research found many gaps to be the 
result of clerical error rather than missing data and that sufficient data are 
available to construct study populations of a size suitable for valid 
epidemiological studies. 
40 Exposure estimation for these branches of the military is usually simpler 
because, for example, most Naval units (with known exceptions such as 
Riverine units) were located offshore and thus had no opportunity for exposure. 
In addition, there were a limited number of Air Force installations and the 
Marines belonged to a comparatively small number of units, mostly assigned to 
I Corps (the northern region) in comparatively restricted areas. 
41 See Jeanne Mager Stellman et al., A Geographic Information System for 
Characterizing Exposure to Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam, 
supra note 33; Steven D. Stellman & Jeanne Mager Stellman, Exposure 
Opportunity Models for Agent Orange, Dioxin, and Other Military Herbicides 
Used in Vietnam, supra note 34. 
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systematically higher exposure for the combat units whose 
locations were in the heavily sprayed areas of III Corps described 
above, indicate both face and content validity. 
Two studies have compared the EOIs calculated in the GIS 
with serum dioxin. These comparisons provide an objective 
measure of body burden when samples are taken sufficiently close 
in time to the exposure event and when the kinetics of metabolism 
are taken into account. In 1989, Dr. Sylvaine Cordier of France’s 
National Institute of Health and Medical Research (INSERM) 
requested that the authors help evaluate exposures for a series of 
twenty-seven patients admitted for abdominal surgery to the Cho 
Ray Hospital in Ho Chi Minh City, for whom adipose tissue was 
being collected for subsequent dioxin assay. EOIs were estimated 
through our then-current algorithms using the subjects’ residential 
locations. Five patients’ levels were at background. For the 
remaining twenty-two patients, the Pearson correlation 
coefficient42 was 0.50 for association between the log of serum 
dioxin and the log of the EOI.43 The second biomarker study was a 
pilot project that was part of a collaboration between the authors 
and the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), 
which had carried out a case-control study of non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma and soft tissue sarcomas in Vietnamese civilians in Ho 
Chi Minh City between 1993 and 1996.44 This study also produced 
a significant correlation. 
Apart from this quantitative validation, a qualitative 
concordance has been observed between extremely high dioxin 
concentrations in samples of soil taken at an abandoned U.S. air 
                                                          
42 The Pearson correlation coefficient is a measure of association between 
two variables. Its value ranges from -1 to +1. A zero coefficient indicates no 
association, while a ±1 is either a perfectly direct or perfectly inverse 
relationship. Squaring the correlation coefficient approximates the degree of 
variation “explained” by the association. A statistically significant correlation of 
0.50 is generally considered strong in environmental studies. 
43 Pierre Verger et al., Correlation between Dioxin Levels in Adipose Tissue 
and Estimated Exposure to Agent Orange in South Vietnamese Residents, 65 
ENVTL. RES. 226 (1994). 
44 Eva Kramarova et al., Exposure to Agent Orange and Occurrence of 
Soft-Tissue Sarcomas or Non-Hodgkin Lymphomas: An Ongoing Study in 
Vietnam, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 671, 671 (1998). 
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base in the Ashau Valley45 and the HERBS file locations of 
sprayings of Agent Purple at the same location. Agent Purple was 
an early herbicide with a dioxin contamination level estimated at 
10 to 100 times that of Agent Orange.46 
CONCLUSION 
In its review of the methodological work on the GIS described 
in this article, the IOM confirmed that the exposure opportunity 
methodology and the resulting GIS system made epidemiological 
studies possible and, moreover, urged that epidemiological studies 
be undertaken immediately.47 The editors of Nature similarly 
agreed that the work on the GIS and on the revised inventory of 
spraying (the HERBS file) enabled the performance of urgently 
needed studies on the effects of Agent Orange.48 
                                                          
45 L. Wayne Dwernychuk et al., Dioxin Reservoirs in Southern Viet Nam: A 
Legacy of Agent Orange, 47 CHEMOSPHERE 117, 121 (2002). 
46 Recently the possibility that the elevated dioxin could be attributed to 
storage of herbicide at Special Forces base was raised. See L. Wayne 
Dwernychuk, Dioxin Hotspots in Vietnam, CHEMOSPHERE (forthcoming). This is 
highly unlikely since operational records specifically state that all defoliation 
was to be carried out by C-123 spray mission because tree height made hand 
spraying impractical and the loading of spray planes is documented to have 
taken place at Tan Son Nhut Air Force base and not at the camp itself. The camp 
was only in operation for a relatively brief period of time because it proved to be 
ineffective against the Viet Cong insurgency, thus making it likely that 
documentation of spraying is complete. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 
RECORDS OF THE U.S. FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM (MACV), ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR 
OPERATIONS (J3), CHEMICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION (MACJ-3–09). Herbicide 
Operations Plans (1966–1967) series, Record Group 472 (National Archives 
and Records Administration, College Park, MD; 1950–75). 
47 COMMITTEE ON THE ASSESSMENT OF WARTIME EXPOSURE TO 
HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CHARACTERIZING EXPOSURE 
OF VETERANS TO AGENT ORANGE AND OTHER HERBICIDES USED IN VIETNAM: 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (National Academy of Sciences Press, 
Washington, D.C., 2003). 
48 Some of the work reported here appeared as a cover article in Nature, 
which was accompanied by the following legend: “[T]his work has provided a 
geographic information system that will allow epidemiologists to piece together 
health effects that may exist in the region as they now have a much clearer idea 
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It is of interest that the work undertaken on behalf of the NAS 
built upon the exposure methodologies adopted by the Special 
Master for the Agent Orange Veterans Payment Program as a 
means for determining whether a deceased or disabled claimant 
met the court-established criteria for exposure. The court had 
reasoned that the NAS previously had considered the HERBS file 
to be a unique and valid source of specific information on the 
military spraying49 and that “geographic and temporal limits must 
be set to determine whether a veteran who was in a location near a 
sprayed area at or subsequent to the time of spraying will be 
considered exposed.”50 This reasoning has now been affirmed by 
the IOM. 
The IOM recommendations were strongly endorsed with 
bipartisan support by both the House and Senate Veterans Affairs 
Committees, which requested that the VA initiate such studies 
immediately.51 The VA responded that the studies were still 
premature, but that “in-house” validation studies would be carried 
out.52 Such an internal study by the VA is, in fact, explicitly 
disallowed by the Agent Orange Act of 1991, which sought to 
avoid potential conflicts of interest by mandating that a major 
epidemiological study be carried out by non-governmental 
researchers. Further correspondence from the VA to the American 
Legion53 at the time of this writing indicates that the VA has taken 
no further steps to launch an external investigation and plans to 
continue with its internal studies until at least 2007. 
                                                          
about the distribution of the agents (and dioxin) and about the ‘hot spots.’” 
49 COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM, NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM; PART A. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS (National Academy of Sciences Press, 
Washington, D.C., 1974). 
50 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396, 1417 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
51 Letter from U.S. Congress House and Senate Veterans’ Affairs 
Committees to Honorable Anthony Principi (Nov. 24, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
52 Letter from Honorable Anthony Principi to U.S. Congress House and 
Veterans Affairs Committees (Dec. 18, 2003) (on file with author). 
53 Letter from Jonathan B. Perlin, Acting Undersecretary for Health, Dep’t 
of Veterans Affairs, to John Sommer (Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with author). 
